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VIDEO GAMES AND NCAA ATHLETES: RESOLVING A 
MODERN THREAT TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Alex Vlisides* 
ABSTRACT 
In 2013, two U.S. Courts of Appeals ruled that NCAA athletes 
could maintain right of publicity claims against a video game maker 
for use of their likeness.  These decisions in favor of sympathetic 
plaintiffs reveal the threat that current right of publicity doctrine 
poses to First Amendment rights.  The right of publicity tests applied 
by lower courts conflict with both the Supreme Court precedent and 
the theoretical foundations of the doctrine.  This article reviews and 
rejects this test, ultimately proposing a new test.  This two-tiered 
right of publicity test better protects the values of right of publicity 
while protecting the First Amendment rights of content creators.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) would not 
describe its mission as benefitting a “small number of people who get 
very, very rich on the exploitation of young students.”1  The NCAA 
would not describe its relationship with Electronic Arts (EA), the 
maker of popular college athletics video games, as “exploitation of 
player’s names and likenesses for commercial purposes.”2  It 
certainly would not describe its insistence that college athletes 
maintain an unpaid, amateur status as a “transparent excuse for 
monopoly operations.”3  However, this is how current and former 
 
*  JD, University of Minnesota Law School; MA, University of Minnesota School of 
Journalism and Mass Communication; BS, University of Wisconsin. 
1. Third Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint ¶ 416, In re NCAA Student-
Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., No. C 09-01967 CW (N.D. Cal. July 19, 
2013) (quoting James Duderstadt, former President of Univ. of Mich. (June 2013)). 
 2. Id. ¶ 414 (quoting E-mail from Dan Beebe, former Comm’r of the Big Twelve (July 
27, 2009)). 
 3. Id. ¶ 412 (quoting WALTER BYERS, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: EXPLOITING 
STUDENT ATHLETES 388 (1995)). 
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officials of the NCAA and its member universities have described the 
system.4 
In In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing 
Litigation, current and former college athletes were seeking a share 
of the billions of dollars in revenue that college athletics produce.5  
Among the athletes’ legal claims was that their likenesses were 
improperly licensed without compensation from the NCAA and 
Collegiate Licensing Company (CLC) to EA, thus violating their 
right of publicity.6  On September 26, 2013, the athletes’ plaintiff 
class reached a proposed settlement with EA and the CLC, releasing 
the right of publicity claims against those defendants in exchange for 
a reported $40 million.7  This settlement, and the continuing case 
against the NCAA, satisfies many people’s gut-level responses to an 
NCAA system that enriches large corporations and athletic 
administrators while denying any compensation to the young, unpaid 
athletes who sacrifice their time and sometimes health to produce the 
massive revenues of college sports.  The NCAA system, through 
which EA acquired the license to create its video games, has been 
described as “unfair,”8 “evil,”9 and even “tragic.”10  But, as United 
States Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito put it, “tragic facts make 
bad law.”11 
The recent settlement was spurred by decisions in right of publicity 
cases that have applied the right too broadly and without respect to 
the interests that animate the doctrine.  In Hart v. EA12 and In re 
 
 4. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. 
 5. Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing 
Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268, 1272 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 6. Third Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 5–6. 
 7. Steve Eder, E.A. Sports and Collegiate Licensing to Pay $40 Million to Compensate 
Athletes, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/28/sports/nc
aafootball/ea-sports-and-collegiate-licensing-to-pay-40-million-to-compensate-
athletes.html?_r=0. 
 8. Michael Rosenberg, Debate Over Antiquated NCAA Goes Way Beyond Pay-For-Play, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.si.com/college-
football/2013/09/27/jim-delany-comments-ncaa-accountability-act. 
 9. Jonathan Weiler, ‘A Brilliantly Devised, Evil System,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 23, 
2013, 1:37 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-weiler/a-brilliantly-
devised-evi_b_3972337.html?utm_hp_ref=ncaa. 
 10. Tate Watkins, College Football 101: College Athletes Deserve Academic Credit for 
Playing, BLEACHER REPORT, (Nov. 16, 2011), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/9436
13-college-football-101-college-athletes-deserve-academic-credit-for-playing. 
 11. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 604 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 12. Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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NCAA,13 U.S. appellate courts found that college football video 
games violate the student athletes’ right of publicity.  These decisions 
applied the wrong doctrinal test for right of publicity, giving too 
much weight to the economic rights of the athletes and too little 
weight to the First Amendment rights of the speakers.  The 
implications of these decisions threaten a broad range of expression 
previously thought to be protected by the First Amendment. The 
makers of films, novels, music, and even non-fiction writing could be 
subject to civil suits based on these precedents.14  
In the only right of publicity case the U.S. Supreme Court has ever 
decided, it announced two competing interests at stake in right of 
publicity cases: the strong First Amendment rights of speakers and 
the government’s interest in incentivizing individual investment by 
protecting a limited intellectual property interest.15  Since the 
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting decision, lower courts 
have not focused on these interests, failing to protect the American 
marketplace of ideas.16  Judges must make difficult decisions, 
sometimes against sympathetic plaintiffs, to preserve First 
Amendment rights.  After examining the interests announced by the 
Zacchini court in detail in Part II, this paper argues that courts should 
embrace a new test for right of publicity that protects speakers while 
serving the interests that the Supreme Court outlined.17  
In Part II, the author performs a close reading of Zacchini, 
pinpointing the interests identified by the Court.  Part III examines 
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, in which the Supreme 
Court extended broad First Amendment protections to video games 
and explained why First Amendment theory required that result.18  
Part IV synthesizes the right of publicity doctrine with the 
marketplace theory of the First Amendment, demonstrating the 
theoretical underpinnings of the Zacchini decision.  Part V overviews 
the development of right of publicity, reviewing the strengths and 
weaknesses of the three main tests that lower courts have adopted. 
Part VI analyzes the application of one of these tests—the 
Transformative Use Test— in Hart and In re NCAA and explores 
how the Transformative Use Test fails to reflect the values articulated 
 
 13. Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing 
Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268, 1268 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 14. See id. at 1289–90 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 15. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 574–76 (1977). 
 16. See infra Part V.  
 17. See infra Parts II, VII. 
 18. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
4 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW Vol. 45 
in Zacchini. Part VII proposes a two-tiered test based in part on the 
commercial speech doctrine, which better identifies expression 
protected against right of publicity claims by focusing on the interests 
articulated in Zacchini.  
 
II. THE LESSONS OF ZACCHINI: THE INTERESTS 
IDENTIFIED BY THE SUPREME COURT FOR 
PROTECTION OF RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. is the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s only decision addressing the First Amendment limitations on 
the right of publicity.19  A close reading of this case is necessary for 
any examination of the doctrine for at least two reasons.  First, 
Zacchini presented a relatively rare factual scenario that formed very 
different issues than many of the cases that have interpreted the case 
and developed the right of publicity doctrine.  Second, the Supreme 
Court articulated in Zacchini the interests that animate the doctrine.  
Right of publicity is a limited property right that can be invoked 
against those engaged in expression that would otherwise be 
protected by the First Amendment.20  The Zacchini court identified 
the state interests that allow for the limitation on otherwise 
constitutionally protected speech.21  The development of the doctrine 
and the tests used to evaluate right of publicity cases, must be 
analyzed with these interests at the forefront. 
Hugo Zacchini was an entertainer who performed novelty shows in 
which he shot himself out of a cannon into a net about 200 feet 
away.22  While performing at a county fair in Ohio, Zacchini saw a 
freelance reporter for a Scripps-Howard television station and asked 
him not to film the performance.23  However, the reporter returned the 
 
 19. Thomas F. Cotter & Irina Y. Dmitrieva, Integrating the Right of Publicity with First 
Amendment and Copyright Preemption Analysis, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 165, 168 
(2010). 
 20. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977). 
 21. Right of publicity is a right granted by states, either by common law or by statute, to 
protect the economic value of a person’s likeness.  See Thomas Phillip Boggess V, 
Cause of Action for an Infringement of the Right of Publicity, in 31 CAUSES OF ACTION 
2d §§ 1–2 (Thomson/West 2006).  Thus, protections of right of publicity vary by 
state.  See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and 
Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 127, 132–33 (1993).  This paper analyzes the limits 
on all state right of publicity laws imposed by the U.S. Constitution. 
 22. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 563. 
 23. Id. at 563–64. 
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next day and recorded the performance.24  A local nightly newscast 
aired a fifteen second film clip which showed Zacchini’s entire act.25  
Zacchini brought suit for several causes of action including 
infringement on his right of publicity.26  The Ohio Supreme Court 
ruled in favor of Scripps-Howard, finding that it had a First 
Amendment protected right to “report in its newscasts matters of 
legitimate public interest.”27  The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, 
finding that the First Amendment did not protect Scripps-Howard’s 
expression.28  The Court found the state could restrict the expression 
because “[w]herever the line in particular situations is to be drawn 
between media reports that are protected and those that are not, we 
are quite sure that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not 
immunize the media when they broadcast a performer’s entire act 
without his consent.”29 
The Court’s analysis put great weight on the fact that the broadcast 
captured and reproduced Zacchini’s entire act:  
The broadcast of a film of petitioner’s entire act poses a 
substantial threat to the economic value of that performance.  
As the Ohio court recognized, this act is the product of 
petitioner’s own talents and energy, the end result of much 
time, effort, and expense.  Much of its economic value lies 
in the ‘right of exclusive control over the publicity given to 
his performance’; if the public can see the act free on 
television, it will be less willing to pay to see it at the fair.30  
The Court espoused two rationales for why the First Amendment 
should not protect the station’s otherwise-lawful journalistic 
activity.31  
First, the news station captured, at the very least, much of the 
economic value of Zacchini’s act and appropriated it for its own uses.  
The Court explained that Zacchini’s act was newsworthy, and 
reporting, commenting and even depicting the act on the news may 
 
 24. Id. at 564. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id.  Zacchini’s claim was based in a common law right of publicity recognized by 
Ohio courts.  Id.  
 27. Id. at 565 (quoting Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 351 N.E.2d 454, 455 
(Ohio 1976)). 
 28. Id. at 578. 
 29. Id. at 574–75. 
 30. Id. at 575. 
 31. Id. at 573–75. 
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very well have been protected speech.32  However, Zacchini had 
developed a fifteen-second novelty act, which people paid to see 
live.33  The important distinction between reporting on the act and 
showing footage of the entire act is that the latter deprives the 
performer of the value that he created through developing his act.  
Broadcast reports, descriptions, and pictures of the act all trade on the 
likeness of Zacchini, creating content for the newscast by 
appropriating his likeness.  But they do not capture and distribute the 
very act that Zacchini has invested time, money and effort to develop. 
 In other words, Zacchini did not have a right to restrict all speech 
that makes use of his likeness or act, but rather only speech that 
threatened to sap his economic incentive to develop his act.  The 
Court regarded the “reward to the owner (as) a secondary 
consideration” of the right of publicity doctrine.34  The right of 
publicity primarily “provides an economic incentive for him to make 
the investment required to produce a performance of interest to the 
public.”35  
The Court’s analysis that right of publicity did not protect a 
likeness holder’s reputation supports this incentive interest.  If the 
doctrine were designed to protect an individual’s right to control his 
or her likeness, there would be no need to distinguish between the 
reputational and economic effects of control.  An individual’s right is 
his to exercise without regard to what type of damage he values.  
However, the doctrine “focus[es] on the right of the individual to reap 
the reward of his endeavors and [has] little to do with protecting 
feelings or reputation.”36  Although right of publicity is an action 
brought by individuals, the state’s interest is in protecting economic 
incentives.37  The Zacchini court defined it as a limited right granted 
to support investment in expression of public value.38 
The Court’s pronouncement that the right of publicity was not a 
reputational right has another important implication.  In right of 
publicity cases, claimants do not object to the fact of publication, but 
 
 32. Id. at 578.  “If under this standard respondent had merely reported that petitioner was 
performing at the fair and described or commented on his act, with or without 
showing his picture on television, we would have a very different case.”  Id. at 569. 
 33. Id. at 563. 
 34. Id. at 577 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,  
334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)).  
 35. Id. at 576. 
 36. Id. at 573. 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id.  
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rather that they are not compensated.39  The public, and therefore the 
marketplace of ideas, will not “be deprived of the benefit of 
petitioner’s performance as long as his commercial stake in his act is 
appropriately recognized.”40  In other words, the public interest is in 
promoting valuable expression, and this is served by encouraging 
those like Zacchini to develop and broadcast their talents.  This is the 
essence of the right of publicity.  Much has been made of the Court’s 
analogy of right of publicity to more traditional intellectual 
property.41  But the Court emphasized that the “economic philosophy 
behind” protecting the rights “is the conviction that encouragement of 
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public 
welfare.”42  Protection of the right of publicity is largely a means to 
the end of a richer marketplace of ideas by encouraging people to 
invest in their expression.  The right of publicity prevails where the 
public interest in encouraging investment by the likeness holder 
outweighs the speaker’s First Amendment interests.  
Zacchini has long stood as a somewhat inscrutable explanation of 
the First Amendment bounds on the right of publicity.43  But by 
identifying the interests to be served, lower courts can craft a doctrine 
in line with the Supreme Court’s reasoning.  Foremost, the right of 
publicity is a means to promote investment in expression.  The 
marketplace of ideas is protected by the tailored limitations on 
otherwise protected speech because the right of publicity promotes 
the development of expression that is valuable to the public.  This is 
the value that should underlie all right of publicity analyses. 
III. THE LESSONS OF BROWN: VIDEO GAMES AS CORE 
PROTECTED SPEECH AND THE DANGERS OF 
EVALUATING EXPRESSIVE VALUE 
In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, the Supreme Court 
confronted a state law restricting violent video games and declared 
that video games are, from a First Amendment perspective, 
indistinguishable from books, plays, movies, and other classically 
 
 39. Id. at 578. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See, e.g., 3 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 24:4 
(2015). 
 42. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576 (emphasis added) (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 
219 (1954)). 
 43. See Barbara A. Burnett, The Property Right of Publicity and the First Amendment: 
Popular Culture and the Commercial Persona, 3 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 171, 192 (1990). 
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protected forms of expression.44  Like these mediums, video games 
“communicate ideas—and even social messages—through many 
familiar literary devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and 
music) and through features distinctive to the medium (such as the 
player’s interaction with the virtual world).”45  “That,” the Court 
concluded, “suffices to confer First Amendment protection.”46 
Like these other forms of expression, video games are protected 
even when not communicating core political or ideological speech.47  
The Court has “long recognized that it is difficult to distinguish 
politics from entertainment, and dangerous to try.”48  Moreover, they 
may be indistinguishable, as “[w]hat is one man’s amusement, 
teaches another’s doctrine.”49  The preservation of the marketplace of 
ideas requires free expression, and the Court unequivocally includes 
video games in this protection.  “Under our Constitution, ‘esthetic 
and moral judgments about art and literature . . . are for the individual 
to make, not for the Government to decree, even with the mandate or 
approval of a majority.’”50  
Hart and In re NCAA, like Zacchini, dealt with the restriction of 
expression that is given the broadest protection under the First 
Amendment.51  In Brown, the nation’s highest court reaffirmed a deep 
distrust of value judgments by courts regarding core protected 
speech.52  The Court made clear that judicial analysis of what 
protected speech has more or less societal value is both “difficult” 
and “dangerous.”53  The right of publicity limits First Amendment 
protected speech.  Analysis of the scope of this right must 
acknowledge the fundamental rights at stake and recognize the 
dangers of making value assessments regarding core protected 
speech. 
Thus, Brown provides two foundational principles necessary for 
analyzing a case involving the content of a video game.  First, this 
content is creative expression like art or literature and must be given 
 
 44. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id.  
 47. See id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)). 
 50. Id. (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 259 U.S. 803, 818 (2000)). 
 51. See generally Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & 
Likeness Licensing Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013) (discussing the elements of 
expression); Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013) (analyzing courts’ 
application of a balancing test with regard to a claimed right of publicity). 
 52. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2731 (citing United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2011)). 
 53. Id. at 2733. 
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the highest First Amendment scrutiny.  Second, courts should not 
base decisions on an evaluation of the subjective value of a creative 
expression. 
IV. THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS AND RIGHT OF 
PUBLICITY 
The Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, including 
Zacchini and Brown, has long recognized the Constitution’s role in 
guarding speech rights to protect the marketplace of ideas.54  The 
intellectual roots of marketplace theory are often attributed to two 
influential thinkers, John Milton and John Stuart Mill.  John Milton 
wrote in the seventeenth century of the metaphorical conflict between 
truth and falsehood.  In many ways, marketplace theory can be 
defined by Milton’s question: “Let [Truth] and Falsehood grapple; 
who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open 
encounter[?]”55  In the nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill refined 
the theory with a focus on the assumptions that underlie any attempt 
to silence opinion: that the speech of the silencer is more valuable 
than the speech of those being silenced.56  Mill argued that the 
constant contradictions of the marketplace of ideas were the only way 
to find truth.57  He wrote, “Complete liberty of contradicting and 
disproving our opinion is the very condition which justifies us in 
assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no other terms can a 
being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being 
right.”58 
In American jurisprudence, the emergence of this marketplace 
theory of the First Amendment is often traced to Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes’ forceful dissent in Abrams v. United States.  “[T]he 
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in 
the competition of the market . . . .  That at any rate is the theory of 
our Constitution.”59  Though the theory has been challenged and 
 
 54. Id.  See generally Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) 
(examining the relationship between privileged speech rights and the right to 
broadcast). 
 55. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH OF MR. JOHN MILTON FOR THE LIBERTY OF 
UNLICENC’D PRINTING 35 (London, W. Johnston 1644). 
 56. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 22 (David Spitz ed., W.W. Norton & Co., Inc. 1975) 
(1859). 
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. at 20. 
 59. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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debated by modern scholars,60 it retains significant influence among 
American courts.61  Even critics of the theory recognize that it 
remains perhaps the most powerful theory of the First Amendment in 
American jurisprudence.62  As the modern Supreme Court stated in 
Knox v. Service Employees International Union, “The First 
Amendment creates ‘an open marketplace’ in which differing ideas . . 
. can compete freely for public acceptance without improper 
government interference.”63  
The Court has understood this theory not only to protect an 
individual’s right to speak, but as a collective imperative to safeguard 
a free marketplace of ideas.  In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, the 
Court declared, “The First Amendment presupposes that the freedom 
to speak one’s mind is not only an aspect of individual liberty—and 
thus a good unto itself—but also is essential to the common quest for 
truth and the vitality of society as a whole.”64  Marketplace theory 
entails both an individual’s ability to participate in the marketplace 
and the societal value of the market’s preservation.65 
Marketplace theory informs the Zacchini court’s attempts to 
reconcile the news station’s speech rights with Zacchini’s economic 
rights.  The news station’s First Amendment right to disseminate 
information implicates core protected speech.66  A sprawling, 
productive marketplace of ideas requires broad freedom to engage in 
such speech.67  However, the government’s interest in protecting 
Zacchini’s likeness also implicates First Amendment values.  As 
explained by the Court in Brown, entertainment such as Zacchini’s 
act has great value in the marketplace.68  After all, “one man’s 
amusement, teaches another’s doctrine.”69  And as explained by the 
Court in Zacchini, the public’s ability to have access to expression 
that requires personal investment to develop, such as Zacchini’s act, 
depends on preservation of the economic incentives promoting such 
 
 60. See, e.g., Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE 
L.J. 1, 1 (1984).  
 61. See 1 SMOLLA, supra note 41, § 2:21. 
 62. Id. § 2:15 
 63. Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2288 (2012) (quoting 
N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 (2008)). 
 64. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503–04 (1984). 
 65. Id.  
 66. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977). 
 67. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (recognizing “a profound 
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”). 
 68. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011). 
 69. Id. (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)). 
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investment.70  Although Zacchini’s personal right of publicity claim 
is based on a property right, not a speech right, the foundation of the 
right of publicity is the public interest in protecting the marketplace 
of ideas.  The right of publicity is a means to this end. 
V. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY TESTS 
Since Zacchini, courts have taken many approaches to evaluate the 
constitutionally permissible scope of the right of publicity.  The Third 
Circuit in Hart and the Ninth Circuit in In re NCAA discussed three 
tests: the Predominant Use Test, the Rogers Test, and the 
Transformative Use Test.71  The Predominant Use Test and the 
Rogers Test focus on the distinction between commercial and 
expressive uses of a person’s likeness.72  Although they have different 
analyses, the tests seek to determine whether the likeness is being 
appropriated for commercial use, which may be restricted by a right 
of publicity claim, or expressive use, which is privileged against such 
claims.73  The Transformative Use Test, applied in Hart and In re 
NCAA, takes the commercial or expressive nature of the use into 
account, but does not make this distinction dispositive.74  Instead, the 
test borrows a concept from copyright law, asking whether the 
likeness is just one of the “raw materials” of the expression or “the 
very sum and substance of the work.”75  Each of these tests, upon a 
careful reading, is inconsistent with the interests that animate the 
right of publicity doctrine as the U.S. Supreme Court defined it in 
Zacchini. 
A. Predominant Use Test 
The Predominant Use Test, as announced in Doe v. TCI 
Cablevision, focuses on whether the use of a likeness is commercial 
 
 70. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576. 
 71. Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 153 (3d Cir. 2013); Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc. (In 
re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268, 1273 
(9th Cir. 2013). 
 72. See Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (en banc); Rogers v. 
Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 73. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 373. 
 74. See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal. 2001) (“We 
ask . . . whether a product containing a celebrity’s likeness is so transformed that it 
has become primarily the defendant’s own expression rather than the celebrity’s 
likeness.”). 
 75. Id. 
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or expressive.76  The Supreme Court of Missouri wrote that “the 
threshold legal question [is] whether the use of a person’s name and 
identity is ‘expressive,’ in which case it is fully protected, or 
‘commercial,’ in which case it is generally not protected.”77  This 
means that use of a likeness in “news, entertainment, and creative 
works for the purpose of communicating information or expressive 
ideas” is highly protected while use in “advertising goods or services 
or . . . merchandise, is rarely protected.”78  
The court argued that this Predominant Use Test would best 
address the issues arising where speech has both expressive and 
commercial elements.79  Courts applying this test are asked to 
determine which type of use, expressive or commercial, 
predominates.  A product “that predominantly exploits the 
commercial value of an individual’s identity” is not protected, while 
a product that predominantly “make[s] an expressive comment on or 
about a celebrity,” is protected.80 
Although the distinction between commercial and non-commercial 
use is a useful one, the court provided little guidance as to how to 
define which use predominates.  Beyond this, the court never 
attempted to reconcile its pronouncement that expressive use, such as 
a newscast, is protected with the Zacchini decision, which found that 
a newscast was not protected.81  The court’s narrow focus on the 
commercial/expression distinction did not allow for a full 
consideration of the interests identified in Zacchini, including the 
incentive interest.82  In addition, it failed to provide the analytical 
tools for other courts to make the distinction.  Courts are left, 
essentially, to weigh the expressive value provided by the use, which 
 
 76. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 373–74. 
 77. Id. at 373. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 374. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See id. at 373; Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 569–79 (1977) 
(holding that the First and Fourteenth Amendments did not protect a newscast that 
displayed a performer’s entire act, as opposed to a newscast that merely reported he 
was performing or described the act).  In fact, one treatise described the Missouri 
Supreme Court as “[e]ssentially holding that the Supreme Court did not really mean 
what it said.”  MARK LEE, ENTERTAINMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 
17:21, Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2015). 
 82. See TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 373; see also Jordon M. Blake, No Doubt About 
It—You’ve Got to Have Hart: Simulation Video Games may Redefine the Balance 
Between and Among the Right of Publicity, the First Amendment, and Copyright Law, 
19 B.U.J. SCI. & TECH. L. 26, 42 (2013) (“The court discussed Zacchini, observing 
that its holding is very narrow and should only be applied in situations analogous to 
having one’s entire act appropriated.”).  
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Justice Scalia would likely call a “difficult” and “dangerous” 
standard on which to rely to discern what speech the Constitution 
protects.83  Few federal courts have endorsed the Predominate Use 
Test.84 
B. Rogers Test 
In Rogers v. Grimaldi, the Second Circuit introduced what later 
courts refer to as the Rogers Test.85  The claim centered on a celebrity 
duo, Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire, whose likenesses Rogers 
claimed had been appropriated by “the use of the title ‘Ginger and 
Fred’ for a fictional movie that only obliquely relate[d] to Rogers and 
Astaire.”86  The Rogers Test, like the Predominant Use Test, focuses 
mainly on the commercial/expressive distinction.  
The court recognized that in reference to celebrities, “prominence 
invites creative comment.”87  Because of the expressive value of such 
comment, the court crafted a narrow test.88  The Rogers Test would 
protect expression from right of publicity claims unless the likeness 
was “wholly unrelated” to the expression or was “simply a disguised 
commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or services.”89  It asks 
whether the appropriation of the likeness is a genuine part of the 
expressive content or a commercial attempt to add value to an 
existing expression through use of the likeness.90  The court found 
that the title was related to the content of the movie and was not a 
disguised advertisement, and thus was protected by the First 
Amendment.91  
 
 83. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011). 
 84. See, e.g., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 153–54 (3d Cir. 2013) (rejecting the 
Predominant Use test and adopting the Transformative Use Test); LEE, supra note 81 
(stating that a Missouri federal court disregarded TCI Cablevision and applied a 
balancing test instead). 
 85. See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989); see also, e.g., Brown v. Elec. 
Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 2013) (referencing the Second Circuit’s 
creation of the Rogers Test); Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 451–52 (6th Cir. 
2003) (applying the Rogers Test). 
 86. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 996. 
 87. Id. at 1004 (quoting Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 460 (Cal. 
1979) (Bird, C.J., concurring)).  
 88. See id. at 999, 1004–05. 
 89. Id. at 1004 (first quoting Guglielmi, 603 P.2d at 457 n.6; then quoting Frosch v. 
Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 427 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (App. Div. 1980)). 
 90. See id. at 1004–05. 
 91. Id. 
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The court limited the analysis to the facts at issue, a celebrity’s 
likeness being invoked in a title.  It made no attempt to square the 
decision with Zacchini or examine how it would be applied in other 
fact patterns.  Although the test is perhaps sufficient to analyze this 
narrow fact pattern, it became problematic as later courts applied it in 
other cases. 
The Sixth Circuit applied the Rogers Test in Parks v. LaFace 
Records.92  Civil rights leader Rosa Parks brought an action against 
rap group Outkast for appropriation of her likeness in the song Rosa 
Parks.93  Though the song was not about Parks or the civil rights 
movement, the song advised competing rappers and MCs to “move to 
the back of the bus.”94  Outkast claimed that Rosa Parks’ name is a 
metaphor for the action that she made famous: refusing to “move to 
the back of the bus.”95  
The court applied the Rogers Test and concluded, “in the context of 
the lyrics . . . the phrase [‘move to the back of the bus’] has 
absolutely nothing to do with Rosa Parks.”96  Simply, the court did 
not believe that there was an artistic motivation for naming the song 
Rosa Parks, but instead found it was chosen to “enhance[] the song’s 
potential sale to the consuming public.”97  The court denied that “the 
symbol of Rosa Parks, a symbol of ‘freedom, humanity, dignity, and 
strength,’ is artistically related to the content of a song that appears to 
be diametrically opposed to those qualities.”98  In other words, the 
First Amendment did not protect this speech because the court either 
does not understand or does not approve of the metaphor.  The court 
even helpfully suggested that a different title, “Back of the Bus, for 
 
 92. 329 F.3d 437, 450 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 93. Id. at 441. 
 94. Id. at 442–43 (quoting OUTKAST, Rosa Parks, on AQUEMINI (LaFace Records 1998)). 
 95. Id. at 452. 
 96. Id. at 452 (emphasis omitted).  The name is used as short hand for a concept, or 
concepts, as a variety of names are.  Famous names become part of language, and 
some people must be the first to use the metaphor.  Names like Einstein or 
Shakespeare even become so associated with a definition that they are commonly 
invoked sarcastically to mean the opposite of their namesake’s qualities.  The court’s 
reasoning would conclude that any song not about theoretical physics or English 
literature could violate these famous individual’s right of publicity. 
 97. Id. at 453. 
 98. Id. at 456.  The Court dismisses Outkast’s invocation of Parks, concluding that 
“[w]hile Defendants’ lyrics contain profanity and a great deal of ‘explicit’ language . . 
. they contain absolutely nothing that could conceivably, by any stretch of the 
imagination, be considered, explicitly or implicitly, a reference to courage, to 
sacrifice, to the civil rights movement or to any other quality with which Rosa Parks is 
identified.”  Id. at 453. 
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example,” would better communicate the artist’s message.99  This 
type of evaluation flies in the face of the First Amendment truism that 
judges should not make “esthetic and moral judgments about art and 
literature.”100 
This disturbing judicial scrutiny applied to artistic choices is a 
product of the failures of the Rogers Test.  The test fails to place the 
incentive interest at the center of analysis.  It is not clear how 
Outkast’s use of Parks’ name would alter the economic incentives of 
Parks or those similar to her.  Zacchini firmly established that the 
right of publicity is not a reputational right.101  If Parks believed the 
song defamed, slandered, or otherwise damaged her reputation, other 
causes of action could be pursued.  The right of publicity protects 
against appropriation to promote individual investment, not against 
artistic invocation of a famous name for a purpose the likeness holder 
happens to disagree with.  
C. Transformative Use Test 
The Transformative Use Test was introduced in Comedy III 
Productions, Inc., v. Gary Saderup, Inc.102 The estates of the famous 
comedy trio The Three Stooges brought an action against an artist 
who produced T-shirts featuring charcoal drawings of The Three 
Stooges.103  The parties stipulated that the shirts did not “constitute an 
advertisement, endorsement, or sponsorship of any product,” but the 
plaintiffs claimed that the First Amendment nonetheless did not 
protect the shirts against the right of a publicity claim.104 
The California Supreme Court applied what later courts would call 
the Transformative Use Test, which analogizes right of publicity to 
copyright law, borrowing part of the Fair Use Doctrine.105  The test 
asks courts to determine whether the challenged work has “so 
transformed [the likeness] that it has become primarily the 
defendant’s own expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness.”106  
This is determined by evaluating “whether the celebrity likeness is 
one of the ‘raw materials’ from which an original work is 
 
 99. Id. at 453.  
 100. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (quoting United States 
v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000)). 
 101. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977). 
 102. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 799 (Cal. 2001). 
 103. Id. at 800–01. 
 104. Id. at 801. 
 105. Id. at 808. 
 106. Id. at 809. 
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synthesized, or whether the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is 
the very sum and substance of the work in question.”107  
The California Supreme Court identified many interests that 
underlie right of publicity.  The court spent significant time 
examining the First Amendment interests at stake and recognized the 
important expression that the use of famous likenesses can 
contribute.108  It acknowledged that the theory of the First 
Amendment requires protections “‘to preserve an uninhibited 
marketplace of ideas’ and to repel efforts to limit ‘uninhibited, robust 
and wide-open’ debate on public issues.’”109  
The court reasoned that “when a work contains significant 
transformative elements, it is not only especially worthy of First 
Amendment protection, but it is also less likely to interfere with the 
economic interest protected by the right of publicity.”110  The court 
described the Transformative Use Test as comporting with many of 
the values established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Zacchini and 
Brown.  Because “courts are not to be concerned with the quality of 
the artistic contribution,”111 the test’s inquiry is “more quantitative 
than qualitative, asking whether the literal and imitative or the 
creative elements predominate in the work.”112  This attempt to avoid 
judicial value judgments of expressive content is laudable and 
necessary to comport with Brown.  
The court’s application of the Transformative Use Test had many 
strengths.  It identified the incentive interest for right of publicity 
established by Zacchini.113  It explicated the strong First Amendment 
protections even as applied to “nontraditional media of 
expression.”114  It recognized the dangers of judicial value 
assessments of expression and attempted to create a framework that 
avoids such assessments.115  
One major weakness of the Transformative Use Test is that it does 
not provide a clear framework for making the “‘commonsense’ 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 802–04.  
 109. Id. at 803 (quoting Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 458 (Cal. 
1979) (Bird, C.J., concurring)). 
 110. Id. at 808. 
 111. Id. at 809. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 808 (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977)). 
 114. Id. at 804. 
 115. Id. at 809 (“[C]ourts are not to be concerned with the quality of the artistic 
contribution . . . .”). 
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distinction”116 between commercial and noncommercial speech.  
Although some of the analysis seems to assume that commercial 
speech would be due lesser protection,117 the California Supreme 
Court never made clear how the operation of the test achieves that 
end.  The failure to make this distinction makes it more difficult to 
identify expression the First Amendment protects from right of 
publicity claims, because the Supreme Court has found that the 
protections due noncommercial speech are different, and greater, than 
commercial speech.118 
A second major weakness is that although the Comedy III Products 
court identified the important interests of the doctrine, the test fails to 
precisely focus on them.  As to the scope of protection, the California 
Supreme Court found that the right of publicity should protect against 
“production of conventional, more or less fungible, images of the 
celebrity.”119  The idea of a “more or less fungible” use of a likeness 
in many ways cuts to the core of questions about transformative 
use.120  The court was asking, Did the expression appropriate the 
likeness in a way that could more or less have been made by someone 
else?  Or did the expression require creative investment that 
transformed it into a valuable contribution in the marketplace of 
ideas?121  These questions are paramount.  In evaluating close calls 
and tough factual scenarios, it is indispensable to understand the 
values fundamental to these questions.  However, courts applying the 
Transformative Use Test have focused on the transformative nature 
of the use as an end in itself.122  The transformative nature of 
expression is just a proxy, and not the only one, for whether the 
public will be deprived of a creative contribution if the expression is 
restricted.  The central question is, Was the use transformative, 
thereby making it a distinct contribution to the marketplace of 
ideas?123 
 
 116. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980) 
(quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978)). 
 117. See Comedy III Prods., Inc., 21 P.3d at 803. 
 118. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562–63 (citing Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456). 
 119. Comedy III Prods., Inc., 21 P.3d at 808. 
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. at 809. 
 122. See, e.g., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 163 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he 
Transformative Use Test maintains a singular focus on whether the work sufficiently 
transforms the celebrity’s identity or likeness . . . .”).   
 123. See Comedy III Prods., Inc., 21 P.3d at 811 (explaining how Andy Warhol’s 
“distortion and . . . careful manipulation of context” in his silkscreens of celebrities 
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The weaknesses of this test become clearer when applied in later 
cases.  The Hart and In re NCAA cases demonstrate how a generally 
well-constructed test that recognizes the interests of the doctrine can 
lead to unpredictable and dangerous conclusions because of a failure 
to focus precisely and consistently on the proper values.124 
VI. THE TRANSFORMATIVE USE TEST IN HART AND IN RE 
NCAA 
Hart and In re NCAA were right of publicity cases that presented 
“materially identical” legal challenges, according to the Ninth 
Circuit.125  The principal plaintiffs in the cases were former Rutgers 
University quarterback Ryan Hart in Hart and former Nebraska 
University quarterback Samuel Keller in In re NCAA.126  Both were 
featured in EA’s football video game series NCAA Football.127  In 
these cases, the Third and Ninth Circuits applied the Transformative 
Use Test, finding that the First Amendment did not, as a matter of 
law, protect defendant EA’s expression.128  These two cases created 
the legal environment in which EA settled with the plaintiff class of 
former NCAA athletes for a reported $40 million.129  Though this 
case has settled, the larger question remains: when can content 
creators use a person’s likeness without compensation?  Evaluating 
the analysis from these two cases reveals that the outcomes in Hart 
and In re NCAA are unacceptable in two ways.  First, the decisions 
failed to properly identify and apply the interests identified by the 
Supreme Court in Zacchini.  Second, the muddled analysis, and 
disagreement amongst the judges in the same circuits, left artists and 
content creators with little guidance as to when the First Amendment 
protects their work from a right of publicity suit.  As explored further 
below, this lack of clarity is damaging to First Amendment 
expression and counter to the values of the right of publicity doctrine. 
In Hart, the Third Circuit wrote that “the Transformative Use Test 
maintains a singular focus on whether the work sufficiently 
 
created transformative expressions that surpassed a mere reproduction of celebrity 
portraits).  
 124. See Hart, 717 F.3d at 170; Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete 
Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268, 1283–84 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 125. In re NCAA, 724 F.3d at 1278 (citing Hart, 717 F.3d. at 141); see also Hart, 717 F.3d 
at 163 n.28 (“Keller is simply [Hart] incarnated in California.”).  
 126. Hart, 717 F.3d at 145; In re NCAA, 724 F.3d at 1271. 
 127. Hart, 717 F.3d at 146; In re NCAA, 724 F.3d at 1271. 
 128. Hart, 717 F.3d at 170; In re NCAA, 724 F.3d at 1276, 1284. 
 129. Eder, supra note 7. 
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transforms the celebrity’s identity or likeness.”130  Right of publicity 
tests, including the Transformative Use Test, are a means to the end 
of balancing the property interests and speech interests at stake.  By 
creating a “singular focus” on transformative use,131 the Hart and In 
re NCAA courts failed to ask the deeper and more important question: 
Does restricting the expression serve to incentivize likeness holders 
without denying creative and unique speech access to the 
marketplace of ideas?  Transformative use is one way of answering 
this question, but “singular focus” on the transformative nature of use 
leads to a predictable conclusion: a failure to serve the interests of the 
doctrine. 
The courts’ analyses reveal the consequences of this problematic 
focus.  The Hart court concluded that the video game’s use of Hart’s 
likeness was not transformative for several reasons.  First, the game 
strived for realism both in Hart’s appearance and in the situations in 
which he appears.  In other words, “[t]he digital Ryan Hart does what 
the actual Ryan Hart did while at Rutgers: he plays college 
football.”132  In addition, the games will appeal to the fans of a 
player’s university, implying that the realism is the value of the 
expression.133  The In re NCAA court analogized to Comedy III 
Products, reasoning that like the drawings in that case, making the 
video games required “undeniable skill” but that skill is “manifestly 
subordinated to the overall goal of creating literal, conventional 
depictions” of Keller.134  Addressing the argument that the likeness is 
but a small part of a creative and transformative whole, the court 
declared that “the Transformative Use Test invariably look[s] to how 
the celebrity’s identity is used.”135  Creative elements are 
transformative only to the extent that they affect the depiction of a 
celebrity likeness.  
The courts’ analyses that the use was not transformative are 
problematic in a few ways.  The dissents in each case identified one 
issue by pointing out the danger of the majorities’ reasoning applied 
more broadly.  The dissent in In re NCAA concluded that “[t]he 
 
 130. Hart, 717 F.3d at 163 (emphasis added).  
 131. Id.  
 132. Id. at 166.  The Ninth Circuit applied the same reasoning.  See In re NCAA, 724 F.3d 
at 1279 (“NCAA Football realistically portrays college football players in the context 
of college football games . . . .”). 
 133. Hart, 717 F.3d at 168. 
 134. In re NCAA, 724 F.3d at 1278 (quoting Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 
21 P.3d 797, 811 (Cal. 2001)). 
 135. Hart, 717 F.3d at 169. 
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logical consequence of the majority view is that all realistic 
depictions of actual persons, no matter how incidental, are protected 
by a state law right of publicity regardless of the creative context.”136  
Because, under Brown, video games receive the same First 
Amendment protection as, for instance, books or film, the majority 
analysis would restrict many expressive works traditionally thought 
to be protected by the First Amendment.137  
Another issue is the reliability of the analysis to produce 
predictable results.  Where speakers would be likely to self-censor 
due to concerns that their speech would be “in or near the uncertain 
reach of” a law, “[t]he Constitution gives significant protection from 
overbroad laws that chill speech.”138  The First Amendment requires 
that speakers know when their speech is prohibited.139  Although this 
interest may be slightly lessened in the civil area, it is important 
nonetheless.  It is important to note that each of these cases contained 
strong dissents, not only finding that EA’s expression should be 
protected, but also explaining the dangers of the majorities’ 
reasoning.140  This vast disparity between judges applying the same 
test speaks to the lack of clarity that the Transformative Use Test 
provides. 
Another aspect of the Hart majority opinion demonstrated the 
unpredictable results of Transformative Use Test analysis.  In 
addition to the animated depiction of Hart featured in NCAA Football 
2006, a picture of Hart was used in an introductory montage in NCAA 
 
 136. In re NCAA, 724 F.3d at 1290 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 137. Id. (“This logic jeopardizes the creative use of historic figures in motion pictures, 
books, and sound recordings.  Absent the use of actual footage, the motion picture 
Forrest Gump might as well be a box of chocolates.  Without its historical characters, 
Midnight in Paris would be reduced to a pedestrian domestic squabble.  The 
majority’s holding that creative use of realistic images and personas does not satisfy 
the Transformative Use Test cannot be reconciled with the many cases affording such 
works First Amendment protection.”).  
 138. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002). 
 139. See Kevin Francis O’Neill, A First Amendment Compass: Navigating the Speech 
Clause with a Five-Step Analytical Framework, 29 SW. U. L. REV. 223, 278–82 
(2000). 
 140. See In re NCAA, 724 F.3d at 1289 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[A]n individual college 
athlete’s right of publicity is extraordinarily circumscribed and, in practical reality, 
nonexistent.”); Hart, 717 F.3d at 175–76 (Ambro, J., dissenting) (“I sympathize with 
the position of Hart and other similarly situated college football players, and 
understand why they feel it is fair to share in the significant profits produced by 
including their avatar likenesses into EA’s commercially successful video game 
franchise. I nonetheless remain convinced that the creative components of NCAA 
Football contain sufficient expressive transformation to merit First Amendment 
protection.”).  
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Football 2009.141  However, unlike the depiction in the video game, 
the court found that “the context of [Hart’s] photograph—the 
montage—imbues the image with additional meaning beyond simply 
being a representation of the player.”142  The court almost 
inexplicably concluded that an animation of Hart, drawn and 
animated by designers, placed into an interactive, meticulously 
designed virtual world, is a “literal” depiction of Hart and thus 
unworthy of First Amendment protection, while a photograph of 
Hart, shown in a montage with other football players, had been 
transformed to be predominately the creative expression of its 
designers.143  This reveals a major problem with the majority’s 
reasoning.  The test is not focused enough to provide consistent 
application. 
When applied to a more traditional form of expression, for 
instance, a documentary, the First Amendment issues with this 
application may become clearer.  The Hart majority insisted that the 
test would preserve “already-existing First Amendment protections” 
for “documentaries . . . and other expressive works depicting real-life 
figures.”144  One can certainly imagine a documentary, rather than a 
video game, about college football featuring depictions of Hart.  The 
documentary would, of course, strive for realism, and would likely 
appeal to college football fans.  It would depict Hart participating in 
the very activity for which he gained prominence: playing football for 
Rutgers.  The depictions of Hart would be literal depictions, perhaps 
the popular documentary style of a camera panning across an image 
as a voiceover makes description or commentary.  It is simply not 
clear why any of these uses are more transformative than the video 
game at issue in Hart.  The court’s explanation of the Transformative 
Use Test implies and explicitly identifies traditional expressive works 
that would be protected,145 but the logical operation of the test reveals 
 
 141. Hart, 717 F.3d at 176 n.9. 
 142. Id. at 170 (citing ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 938 (6th Cir. 2003)). 
 143. Id. (“We therefore hold that NCAA Football 2004, 2005, and 2006 games at issue in 
this case do not sufficiently transform [Hart’s] identity to escape the right of publicity 
claim . . . .  [W]e do hold that the only apparent use of [Hart’s] likeness in NCAA 
Football 2009 (the photograph) is protected by the First Amendment . . . .”).  But see 
id. at 170 n.47 (“In finding that NCAA Football failed to satisfy the Transformative 
Use Test, we do not hold that the game loses First Amendment protection.  We merely 
hold that the interest protected by the right of publicity in this case outweighs the 
Constitutional shield.”). 
 144. Id. at 165 (Ambro, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 173). 
 145. See id. 
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little distinction between those works and the video game the court 
found to be outside the scope of First Amendment protection. 
Such vexing and amorphous analysis is among the many reasons 
that the Transformative Use Test is unacceptable.  Despite the 
Supreme Court’s deep reservations about judicial decisions on the 
expressive value of an expressive work,146 this is ultimately what the 
Transformative Use Test leads to.  As the Hart court ironically 
pointed out in reference to the Predominant Use Test, where courts 
are asked “to analyze select elements of a work to determine how 
much they contribute to the entire work’s expressiveness,” the result 
is “subjective at best, [and] arbitrary at worst.”147  However, the 
court’s analysis asked whether “imitative” or “creative” elements 
predominate a work, requiring, as the court pointed out about the 
Predominant Use Test, a value-laden analysis of the degree of 
expressiveness.148  The intuition of a judge about the creative value of 
protected speech should never be the line between protected and 
unprotected speech: between that which will reach and that which 
will be restricted from the marketplace of ideas. 
VII. A PROPOSAL: A TWO-TIERED TEST  
A fundamental complication within right of publicity doctrine is 
that there are two different problems to be confronted.  The tests 
examined above generally failed to parse these two issues.  The 
Predominant Use Test and Rogers Test largely focused on how to 
differentiate commercial and expressive content.149  The 
Transformative Use Test focused on how to determine whether the 
use was sufficiently expressive to justify its use of a person’s 
likeness.150  The problem, then, is that these tests attempt to separate 
 
 146. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011). 
 147. Hart, 717 F.3d at 154. 
 148. Id. at 159 (“The inquiry is in a sense more quantitative than qualitative, asking 
whether the literal and imitative or the creative elements predominate in the work.” 
(quoting Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal. 
2001))).  
 149. Id. at 154 (“If a product . . . exploits the commercial value of an individual’s identity, 
that product should be held to violate the right of publicity and not be protected by the 
First Amendment, even if there is some ‘expressive’ content in it that might qualify as 
‘speech’ in other circumstances.” (quoting Doe v. TCI Television, 110 S.W.3d 363, 
374 (Mo. 2003))). 
 150. Comedy III Prods., Inc., 21 P.3d at 809 (“Another way of stating the inquiry is 
whether the celebrity likeness is one of ‘raw materials’ from which an original work is 
synthesized, or whether the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the very sum and 
substance of the work in question.  We ask, in other words, whether a product 
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commercial from non-commercial speech, while balancing First 
Amendment interests of the speaker and property interests of the 
likeness holder.  As that sentence perhaps demonstrates, this 
approach is destined to result in muddled analysis that does not 
squarely confront the issues.  
A two-tiered approach to the right of publicity simplifies the 
analysis by separating the issues.  First, is the expression 
commercial?  If so, the appropriation is likely not protected by the 
First Amendment.151  If the expression is noncommercial, then a 
balancing test of the interests identified in Zacchini should be 
applied.152  The test should balance the degree to which protection of 
the right of publicity will protect the economic incentive of the 
claimant to develop his skill against the degree to which the public 
will be deprived of the expression that is at issue.153 
A. Step One: Commercial Expression 
The Supreme Court has long recognized an intermediate level of 
protection for commercial speech.154  There are several reasons for 
this.  First, the “truth of commercial speech . . . may be more easily 
verifiable by its disseminator” because the speaker “presumably 
knows more . . . than anyone else,” “about a specific product or 
service that he himself provides.”155  Additionally, commercial 
speech does not necessarily operate like other speech in the 
marketplace of ideas.  Generally, commerce transactions are brief and 
episodic.  Consumers, who must make short-term decisions on 
products and service with limited information, may not have time for 
 
containing a celebrity’s likeness is so transformed that it has become primarily the 
defendant’s own expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness.”).  
 151. Because this paper has not carefully examined analysis applied to commercial 
expression, it will not propose a test for such cases.  Although some have argued that 
commercial appropriation of a likeness is due no First Amendment protection, this is a 
topic for further research.  See, e.g., Lane v. Random House, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 141, 
147 (D.D.C. 1995). 
 152. Hart, 717 F.3d at 152–53 (“In the wake of Zacchini, courts began applying a 
balancing inquiry to resolve cases where a right of publicity claim collided with First 
Amendment protections.  While early cases approached the analysis from an ad hoc 
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(citation omitted)). 
 153. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575–76 (1977). 
 154. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 573 
(1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 155. Va. Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 
(1976).  
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the “sifting and winnowing” of ideas to take place.156  As Justice 
Stevens wrote, “[t]he evils of false commercial speech, which may 
have an immediate harmful impact on commercial transactions,” 
justify greater regulation.157  And finally, commercial speech is less 
likely to be “chilled” because of the strong economic incentives of 
the speakers.158  For these same reasons, it is imperative to make this 
distinction in right of publicity cases. 
Although courts in right of publicity cases have generally 
recognized that commercial expression is deserving of less First 
Amendment protection, they have not defined or evaluated 
commercial expression consistently.  To give clarity and consistency 
to the test, the initial step in right of publicity analysis should be a 
determination of whether the expression is commercial. 
In Dryer v. National Football League, former professional football 
players sought compensation for use of their likenesses in highlight 
films.159  On a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the federal 
district court declared that the “threshold inquiry [was] whether the 
films [were] . . . expressive works entitled to the highest protection 
under the First Amendment, or commercial speech entitled to less 
protection.”160  The court acknowledged that defining commercial 
speech with precision had challenged courts, and that the U.S. 
Supreme Court “commented on ‘the difficulty of drawing bright lines 
that will clearly cabin commercial speech in a distinct category.’”161  
However, the court applied the test designed by the Eighth Circuit in 
Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp.,162 which was derived from the 
factors enumerated by the Supreme Court in Bolger v. Youngs Drug 
Products Corp.163 
The three-part Porous Media Corp. test concludes that expression 
is commercial where: 
1.  It is an advertisement; 
2.  It refers to a specific product or service; and 
 
 156. THEODORE HERFURTH, SIFTING AND WINNOWING (1948), reprinted in ACADEMIC 
FREEDOM ON TRIAL 58, 59 (W. Lee Hansen ed., 1998). 
 157. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 496 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 158. Va. Bd. of Pharm., 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. 
 159. Dryer v. Nat’l Football League, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1115 (D. Minn. 2010). 
 160. Id. at 1116. 
 161. Id. at 1117 (quoting City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419 
(1993)). 
 162. 173 F.3d 1109 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 163. 463 U.S. 60, 66–67 (1983). 
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3.  The speaker has an economic motivation.164 
The court applied this analysis, ruling that a reasonable fact finder 
could find that the films were commercial speech, akin to 
infomercials for the product of NFL football.165  Thus, the First 
Amendment did not necessarily protect against the right of publicity 
claims.  
Though this test has similar difficulty drawing bright lines that 
other commercial speech tests have,166 it gives courts a sound 
framework, based on Supreme Court precedent, to evaluate 
commercial speech.  Importantly, this analysis also excludes other 
considerations and values for right of publicity analysis; at this stage 
of analysis, a court need only evaluate the commercial nature of the 
speech.  This separation provides greater transparency and clarity in 
courts’ reasoning.  This has the potential to lead not only to better 
reasoned decisions, but also more predictability for parties.  
B. Step Two: Protection of Expressive Speech 
If a court finds the expression to be noncommercial, it is due full 
First Amendment protection.  Courts should then apply a balancing 
test of the interests identified in Zacchini.167  This would balance the 
degree to which protection of the right of publicity will protect the 
economic incentive of the claimant to develop their skill against the 
degree to which the public will be deprived of the expression that is 
at issue.168 
In evaluating these considerations, courts would be wise to borrow 
many of the considerations developed by courts applying the existing 
tests.  For instance, the degree to which the likeness is transformed 
will be very instructive in evaluating the degree to which the public 
would be deprived of the expression.  However, this differs from an 
application of the Transformative Use Test for a few reasons.169  
First, transformative use is just one of the ways that courts may 
evaluate this consideration.  A court could inquire into the degree of 
 
 164. Dryer, 689 F. Supp. 2d at 1117 (citing Porous Media Corp., 173 F.3d at 1120).  The 
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 168. Id. at 576. 
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skill necessary to create the expression, giving greater weight to the 
type of expression that only a few members of society have the 
ability to contribute.  Second, the evaluation of the use’s 
transformative nature is clearly defined as a means, not an end.  
Rather than courts broadly concluding that “when a work contains 
significant transformative elements, it is . . . especially worthy of  
First Amendment protection,”170 the analysis is explicitly defined by 
the interests it serves.  The transformative nature of the use 
necessitates greater protection because it is more likely to make a 
unique contribution to the marketplace of ideas, whereas a simple 
reproduction would be “more or less fungible.”171  Importantly, the 
test asks courts to evaluate whether the public will have access to the 
protected expression, not the value of the protected expression.  
 As applied to Hart and In re NCAA, this test simplifies the 
analysis and ultimately brings about a different conclusion than that 
of the majorities in those cases.  As to the first consideration, it is 
highly dubious that Keller’s use as one among thousands of avatars 
reduced his incentive to develop his football skill and public 
profile.172  In addition, there is little to suggest that the appropriation 
of Keller’s likeness would decrease the public’s interest in watching 
him play football.  In other words, the video game does not serve as a 
replacement for watching live football, but rather contributes another 
aspect of an interest in college football.  Those who “play as” the 
football players in the NCAA Football videogame are at least as 
likely to become more attached to their favorite teams and players 
and have a greater incentive to watch them play.  Zacchini 
convincingly argued that the filming of his performance could 
plausibly replace audiences paying to attend, thus threatening the 
economic value of his show.173  No such showing was made in Hart 
or In re NCAA, likely because the video game does not serve as an 
analogous threat to replace the economic value of players’ 
performances.  This does not mean that Keller’s likeness was not 
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appropriated.  It was.  However, when balancing interests, the 
incentive interest identified by the Supreme Court is quite weak in 
this case.  
The question, then, is whether the First Amendment concerns 
outweigh this small, but present, interest.  This hinges on the degree 
to which the public will be denied the First Amendment protected 
speech.  The Hart court noted the interactivity and the alterability of 
the avatar as somewhat transformative elements, though ultimately 
insufficient.174  Additionally, the scope of the game’s virtual world 
makes the game a technical accomplishment.  EA is likely one of the 
few speakers with the ability to create this interactive, virtual space.  
Balancing this against the slight incentive interest at stake, a court 
applying the two-tiered test would likely find EA’s expression to be 
protected by the First Amendment. 
VIII.    CONCLUSION 
The current right of publicity tests are inadequate to contend with 
the fundamental issues at stake in such cases.  These tests must be 
improved by a focus on two issues.  First, commercial and non-
commercial speech are due different levels of constitutional 
protection.  To properly make this important distinction, courts 
should consider this question as a separate analytical step.  The 
Supreme Court has discussed the elements important to this analysis.  
Based on this discussion, several circuits have adopted a three-part 
test defining commercial speech.175  Although this test has been 
challenged and is subject to limitations, it provides an important 
starting point for courts to apply a consistent and methodologically 
clear analysis identifying commercial speech.  Courts and scholars 
will continue to debate the best way to make the commercial versus 
noncommercial distinction.  For the purposes of right of publicity 
analysis, it is imperative to apply an initial test to separate out core 
First Amendment protected speech. 
Second, a direct focus on the interests identified in Zacchini would 
protect core First Amendment speech and support the values 
underlying the right of publicity.176  Courts should balance the degree 
to which protection of the right of publicity will protect the economic 
incentive of the claimant to develop their skill against the degree to 
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which the public will be deprived of the expression that is at issue.177  
Although balancing tests will always leave some opening for 
ambiguity and interpretation, this test will create greater 
predictability through more transparent analysis.  Courts will need to 
reason through why the decision in a right of publicity case promotes 
the First Amendment values.  This will protect the marketplace of 
ideas and lead to more coherent and reliable outcomes for parties. 
Although Hart and In re NCAA applied the right of publicity 
doctrine to the emerging medium of video games, in cases with very 
sympathetic plaintiffs, these issues merely serve to cloud the right of 
publicity analysis.  The Transformative Use Test and the other 
existing tests fail to properly weigh the interests identified in 
Zacchini and in doing so, fail to protect core First Amendment 
expression.  The right of publicity is, at root, an attempt to protect the 
marketplace of ideas.  By applying this two-tiered test, courts can 
enforce right of publicity claims more predictably and with greater 
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